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Plato, THE PRINCE and Corporate Virtue: Philosophical Approaches to Corporate 
Social Responsibility 
Colin Marks1 & Paul S. Miller2 
 
Abstract 
Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) has been a topic of discussion within 
corporate law and policy for over 40 years.  CSR, in its broadest sense, explores what 
obligations a corporation should or can undertake to further the goals of society.  
Business academics have described four social responsibilities that any company has to 
society: economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic.  The progressive advocates within 
the legal academic debate surrounding CSR argue that a corporation should seek to do 
more than just turn a profit; it should seek to make society “better.”  However, by 
seeking to make society “better,” the corporation begins to act more and more like the 
state.  This raises interesting questions about the role of corporations within society.  
Ethical and political philosophy can help answer these questions.  Much has been written 
from the Utilitarian and Kantian perspectives of business management, especially from 
the Law and Economics movement and its critics.  In the context of CSR, this viewpoint is 
often represented by a shareholder primacy norm, in which the allegiance of the 
corporation is to itself and it shareholders.  However, there is a third branch of 
ethical/political philosophy which argues that social goals are best pursued by discussing 
the kinds of characteristics people should have, especially the characteristics of rulers. 
Two of the most important works that follow this approach are Plato’s REPUBLIC and 
Machiavelli’s THE PRINCE.  
 Machiavelli’s THE PRINCE provides one paradigm for rulers.  For Machiavelli, the 
chief focus of the ruler is to ensure the survival of the state, which is done best by 
ensuring his own survival.  CSR’s usefulness to a corporate prince is that it allows him to 
let his corporation appear to be virtuous, but gives him the freedom to act in the best 
interests of the corporation and himself.  In the REPUBLIC, Plato proposed that rulers owe 
citizens more than survival; they must protect citizens from injustice.  The wise ruler, the 
philosopher king, recognizes that virtue is not only a means of doing good; it is a better 
means of ensuring survival.  Applying this rationale to the corporation as a ruler would 
seem to support the progressive proponents of CSR.  However, applying Plato’s 
paradigm to the CEO and officers may actually support a shareholder primacy norm if 
the corporation’s citizens are equated to the shareholders.  On the other hand a 
Machiavellian approach to CSR in particular and business actions in general could 
strongly support a shareholder primacy viewpoint of business law. 
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This article seeks to explore the aspects of CSR in light of Machiavelli’s THE 
PRINCE and Plato’s REPUBLIC.  These two philosophers sought to explain and justify how 
the rulers of large, socially important institutions, i.e. civil government, operate for the 
good or ill of those who live within them.  As corporations are themselves similar mini-
states, akin to the city-states and poleis in the times of Machiavelli and Plato, and as 
some CSR proponents seek to have the corporation take on many tasks that have, in the 
past, been performed by the state, exploring CSR through these two works provides 
useful insight.  Our topic, however, is not the paths of justice in the ancient or 
renaissance world, but whether these two philosophers can help us understand how CSR 




 “Few men have virtue enough to withstand the highest bidder.” 
George Washington3 
I. Introduction 
 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), was debated long before the meltdown of the 
economy in the Fall of 2008.4  As Robert Reich noted in 2007: 
Over 80 percent of corporate recruiters say business school graduates 
should display an awareness and knowledge of the subject. Hundreds of 
corporate conferences are held on it annually. Tens of thousands of 
corporate executives listen attentively to consultants who specialize in it 
explain its importance. The world's top CEOs and officials, gathering 
annually at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, solemnly 
discuss it and proclaim their commitment to it. Numerous "social auditors" 
now measure how well corporations have achieved it, and hundreds of 
companies produce glossy company reports touting their dedication to it. 
NGOs-nongovernmental organizations, with full-time staffs, Web sites, 
newsletters, and funding appeals-develop codes of corporate conduct on 
aspects of it, and rate corporations on their adherence to it. At least eight 
hundred mutual funds worldwide say they are devoted to it. The United 
Nations Global Compact, launched at Davos in 1999, enumerates goals for 
it, and by 2006 more than three thousand firms had signed on. Great 
Britain even has a minister for it.5 
Of course, how to achieve CSR depends greatly on what your view of a company’s social 
obligations entail.  The famous economist Milton Friedman argued that if corporations 
are making money, they are meeting their social obligations.6  However, many scholars, 
identified as progressives, argue that CSR seeks more from corporations than profit 
making.7  In the legal academic literature, these so-called progressives argue that CSR, 
and the debate that surrounds it, recognizes that corporations can act for the benefit (or 
detriment) of others beyond themselves.8  But CSR cannot be some sort of internalized 
                                                
3  THE QUOTABLE POLITICIAN 223 (William B. Whitman ed. 2003) 
4 See, e.g., Just good business: A special report on corporate social responsibility, THE ECONOMIST, 
January 19, 2008; See Colin P. Marks & Nancy B. Rapoport, The Corporate Lawyer’s Role in a 
Contemporary Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1269 (2009). 
5 Robert Reich, SUPERCAPITALISM 168 (2007). 
6 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Profits, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
MAGAZINE, September 13, 1970. 
7 William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 
261, 265 (1992). 
8 See Colin P. Marks, Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding the Corporate Conscience, 42 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1129, 1149 (2008)(“What is important, however, is what the CSR debate represents, i.e. 
recognition that corporations have the ability to choose to engage, or not engage, in behavior that benefits 
some entity, group, or individual other than just the corporation.”). 
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code for corporate operations as corporations do not have an inner conscience.9  It must, 
therefore, be a tool to be used by a corporation’s human agents.10  Progressive scholars 
have argued that corporations exist to fulfill various social goals, and what those 
particular goals are may be added to or changed as society wishes.11  At the other end of 
the spectrum are those who urge a more Friedman-friendly approach -- that corporations 
should act to the benefit of its owners, i.e. shareholders.  This shareholder primacy norm 
recognizes that corporations should do what is best first and foremost for its own interests 
and CSR should be used to enhance, and not impede, that goal.  But people run a 
corporation.12  So whenever we are discussing corporate responsibility of any sort, we are 
discussing the conduct of corporate officers.13  The question then becomes what might 
influence these corporate officers to adopt CSR initiatives; that is, does CSR help 
corporations survive and does the role of the corporation within society compel the 
adoption of CSR initiatives despite the harm it may do to the corporation?14   This 
question can be explored within the philosophical frameworks of Machiavelli and Plato.   
In THE PRINCE, Machiavelli wrote of the need for leaders to appear virtuous, even 
if they must sometimes act against such virtues.15  A Prince should appear virtuous so as 
not to antagonize his subjects, as they might overthrow him.16  At the same time, the 
Prince cannot let virtue stop him from acting when he sees threats to himself (and by 
extension the state).17  CSR could be seen to be a means by which corporations can also 
appear virtuous.  The degree to which such a use is legitimate depends on the degree to 
which one considers THE PRINCE to be legitimate.18 It is not too far fetched to envision 
                                                
9 Id. at 1144 (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 134 (3d ed. 2005) 
(“[C]orporations are obviously not human. . . .[and] could act to ‘aggregate the worst urges of whole groups 
of men . . . .’”). 
10 Among the types of tool is might be: An ethics code (obviously), a “how to” guide for corporations to 
manage their public reputations, or a means to create value thorough eliminating waste and discovering 
new products.  “Just Good Business,” THE ECONOMIST: JUST GOOD BUSINESS: A SPECIAL REPORT ON 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, 5, Jan. 19, 2008. 
11 Allen, supra n. ____, at 271. 
12 Marks, supra n. _____, at 1144. 
13 Id.; L. Friedman, supra n. ____, at 134. 
14 The definition of harm in this context can be a whole discussion in itself.  Is it just the short term 
reduction in profits that might otherwise be present without CSR, or can longer term, indirect harms to the 
society that the corporation is part of also be taken into account? 
15 Niccolo Machiavelli, THE PRINCE 69 (Daniel Donno trans., Bantam Classics 1966, 2003) (1513) 
[hereinafter THE PRINCE](Therefore a prince will not actually need to have all the qualities previously 
mentioned, but he must surely seem to have them. . . .[H]e must stick to the good so long as he can, but, 
being compelled by necessity, he must be ready to take the way of evil). 
16 Id. at 70 ([T]he prince . . . [should] endeavor to avoid those things which would make him the object of 
contempt or hatred). 
17 Id. 
18 As an example of those who believe it legitimate, consider MANAGEMENT AND MACHIAVELLI by 
Anthony Jay.  It presented THE PRINCE as a primer for how management should conduct itself.  Jay did not 
present his book as a means of acquiring power; instead he viewed Machiavelli as presenting the best 
method for analyzing problems of leadership.  ANTONY JAY, MANAGEMENT AND MACHIAVELLI: AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE LIFE 25.  (“I have called this book Management and 
Machiavelli not because it is based on Machiavelli’s arguments but because it is based upon his method, 
the method of taking a current problem and then examining it in a practical way in the light of experiences 
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today’s CEO seeing his survival and the company’s survival as one and the same.  
Further, the paths to the upper echelons of corporate power are as varied as those of the 
Renaissance Prince.19  All this is to say that the modern CEO might be well disposed to 
act on Machiavelli’s suggestions. 
 A Machiavellian viewpoint, however, is probably not how some proponents of CSR, 
particularly progressives, would like it analyzed.  After all, CSR proponents want 
corporations to act with the interests of stakeholders in mind as they pursue profits.20  
Which philosopher, then, might present a competing vision to THE PRINCE?  This article 
puts forward Plato as the counter to Machiavelli.  The justification for this lies in the 
similarity of the culture of Renaissance Italy and Ancient Greece.  Both were heavily 
influenced by Homer.21  According to Homeric thought, the goods that should be striven 
for are riches, power, status, and prestige–for one’s self and one’s country.  The personal 
attributes that allow a man to reach such goals are considered virtues.22  This is to say that 
if being a good person was to seek the Homeric goals; the personal characteristics that 
allowed one to reach those goals must be seen as good.  The conduct of both the leading 
figures of Fifth Century B.C. Greece and the Italian Renaissance clearly embodied this 
viewpoint.23   
 But what happens when these virtues lead to disaster?  This is what happened to 
Athens after their defeat in the Peloponnesian or the near constant warfare in Italy during 
the late middle ages and Renaissance.  These are the times in which Plato and 
Machiavelli wrote.  Machiavelli’s solution was victory and order at all costs; a 
reinforcement of Homeric ideals.24  Plato’s answer was radically different: 
Unless philosophers become kings in our cities, or unless those who are 
now kings and rulers become true philosophers, so that political power and 
philosophic intelligence converge, and unless those lesser natures who run 
after on without the other are excluded from governing, I believe there can 
no end to troubles . . . , in our cities or for all mankind.25 
                                                                                                                                            
of others who have faced similar problems in the past.”).  But if his method is valid, so too must be its 
conclusions. 
19 THE PRINCE, supra n. ____, at Ch 3-14. 
20 Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate 
Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1601 (2006). 
21  See Alasdair MacIntyre, WHOSE JUSTICE, WHICH RATIONALITY?, 13 (1988) (“Central to that body of 
oral and written matter were the Illiad and the Odyssey.  From Homer, therefore, Athenians had to begin.”) 
and (Discussion of Ancient Greek impact on Humanism in Renaissance Italy). 
22 Such virtues were referred to as aretē.  These were virtues that allowed a person the courage to be 
daring (andreia’) and knowing when to be cautious (sōphrosunē).  MacIntyre, supra n. ___, at 26 (1988). 
23 Some historic examples might be appropriate—perhaps Pericles and Alciabades in Athens and the 
Medici and Borgia families in Italy.   
24 With himself as Odysseus, to judge by his letters, See The Prince, supra note 7, at 4-5, (“Having read 
this thing, they will see that I did not sleep of gamble away the fifteen years I engaged in the study of 
statecraft, and anyone ought to value the services of a man who has become richly experienced at another’s 
expense.) and dedications to Lorenzo di Medici Id. at 15-16 (“And if from your great height Your Highness 
will sometimes cast a glance below to these lowly places, you will see how undeservedly I endure the 
heavy and relentless malice of fortune.”). 
25 Plato, THE REPUBLIC (Richard W. Sterling and William C. Scott, tr., Norton 1985, 1996), 473c (p. 
165).  The numbering used for citations are the ones first put down by Stephanus (Henri Estienne) in his 
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For Plato, it was (and is) the conduct of men that lead to bad results, and what were once 
seen as virtues that govern their actions should be changed for new ones if disaster 
results.26  Plato did not advance this argument naïvely; he was well aware of the 
consequences such arguments could bring, but felt they had to be made.27   
 Our topic, however, is not the paths of justice in the ancient or renaissance world, but 
whether these two philosophers can help us understand how (or whether) CSR can (or 
should) be applied today; perhaps even to warn us of its abuses or encourage CSR’s 
healthy application.  Part II of this article is an explanation of CSR’s historic 
development in both the business management and legal academic context.  Part III 
explains the relevance of Machiavelli and Plato’s works in a modern context.  Part IV ties 
together the paradigms set-out by Machiavelli and Plato with the legal academic 
approaches to CSR.  We conclude that analogies can be made between Machiavelli’s 
view of power and the shareholder primacy norm and Plato and the Progressives if we 
consider them at the level of the corporate entity.  But, the people who actually wield the 
power in the corporations may not in fact see their interests aligned with the shareholders, 
and instead may be more like the foreign invaders that Machiavelli warned against.  
Viewed from this perspective, the Machiavellian model may in fact be more in line with 
how corporations are really governed.  Such a model, however, has evaded description as 
it mimics both the shareholder primacy norm at times, and the Progressive movement at 
other times, but, under examination, should be embraced by neither the shareholder 
primacy norm nor the Progressives. 
II. An Overview of Corporate Social Responsibility 
A. CSR is a name for various theories that present guidelines for corporations 
to further a corporate and/or societal purpose. 
 Before delving too deeply into a discussion of CSR, it is useful, if not essential, to 
review what activities are encompassed by the term CSR.  What exactly does it mean to 
be socially responsible as a corporation?  Is merely obeying the law socially responsible?  
What about choosing to go “green,” which also has economic benefits to the corporation 
as well as society?28  Or is CSR just another way of describing corporate charity?  How 
one defines CSR is important as this has an effect upon whether an individual supports it.  
The famous economist Milton Friedman’s view of CSR provides a classic example of 
this. 
 
1. Friedman’s view of CSR. 
                                                                                                                                            
1578 edition of Plato’s works.  They have become the standard numbering scheme for Plato’s works and 
allow ready comparison of the text from different editions. 
26 See e.g., Plato, GORGIAS, THE REPUBLIC. 
27 E.g. Plato, APOLOGY, CRITO 
28    Or perhaps seeks to simply obscure the corporation’s activities within a pleasant green veneer.  See Joe 
W. Pitts, III, Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J. LAW & 
PUB. POLICY 334 (2009) (“The criticism of CSR as merely, or excessively, a public relations activity 
represents the frustration some critics have with the pace of progress on the ground and insufficient or 
counterproductive implementation of the concept.”). 
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 Friedman quite famously denounced CSR by stating that, in a free economy, “there 
is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in 
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, 
which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.”29  
Based upon this quote, one could easily conclude that the thrust of Friedman’s argument 
was to reject CSR as a legitimate business pursuit.  However, a further reading of 
Friedman’s essays on the topic reveals that Friedman’s definition of CSR was very 
specific.  To Friedman, CSR was nothing more than giving away profits to unrelated 
charitable causes.  If a charitable donation was in fact tied to some other corporate goal, 
ulterior or otherwise, Friedman simply did not call it CSR.  Indeed, Friedman seemed to 
think it was dishonest to even label such giving as CSR, stating that he admired those 
corporations “who disdain such tactics as approaching fraud.”30 
 A closer review of Friedman’s essays on CSR reveals that, though he may not have 
considered it part of CSR, he did believe that corporations have responsibilities to groups 
outside its own shareholders — to abide by the laws in place by governments as well as 
by custom.  As the above cited quote concludes, business has a responsibility to stay 
“within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, 
without deception or fraud.”31  In another essay, Friedman expounds that the corporate 
executive’s responsibility “is to conduct the business in accordance with [the 
shareholders’] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while 
conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in the law and those 
embodied in ethical custom.”32  Thus, though Friedman was against corporate executives 
giving away profits (unless so ordered by the owners/shareholders), if he was presented 
with a model in which legal compliance was an aspect of CSR, he surely would favor at 
least that aspect of it. 
 Many scholars take a broader view of CSR than Friedman.  According to these 
scholars, CSR includes an economic and ethical responsibility in addition to a legal 
compliance responsibility.  Yet, Friedman’s ire at corporate giving is not isolated.  
Indeed, philanthropic activities are often included under ethical responsibility and are the 
focus of much controversy in a number of academic circles. 
2. Business scholars’ view CSR as encompassing a wide range of activities. 
Business management literature has explored the topic of CSR.33  This literature 
defines CSR as including a business’s responsibility to the wider societal good beyond 
                                                
29  MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (2d ed. 1982); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, 
The Social Responsibility of Business, in THE ESSENCE OF FRIEDMAN 36, 36–38 (Kurt R. Leube ed., 1987) 
[hereinafter FRIEDMAN, Social Responsibility]. 
 
30 FRIEDMAN, Social Responsibility, supra n. ___, at 41.  As Friedman notes, however, he would not 
advocate that corporations refrain from using the label CSR if it advantaged the corporation because that 
would, in itself, be asking the corporations to engage in a socially responsible activity.  Id. 
31 FRIEDMAN, supra n. ___, at 133. 
32 FRIEDMAN, Social Responsibility, supra n. ___, at 37 (emphasis added). 
33 See generally Colin P. Marks & Nancy B. Rapoport, The Corporate Lawyer’s Role in a Contemporary 
Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1272-75 (2009).  As Cynthia Williams has noted, “[l]egal 
academics have struggled to produce useful definitions of CSR, and in that effort may be well advised to 
look to management literature.”  Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1629, n. 54 (2006). 
 8 
the business’s economic performance.34  The model most often cited is that of Professor 
Archie Carroll.35  In 1979, Carroll categorized CSR into four social responsibilities that 
businesses have to society: economic responsibilities, legal responsibilities, ethical 
responsibilities, and discretionary (sometimes called philanthropic) responsibilities.36  
The first category, economic responsibility, represents the basic responsibility of a 
business to be profitable.37  The second category, legal responsibility, represents the 
responsibility of a business to operate within the framework of legal requirements.38  The 
third category, ethical responsibility, represents the “responsibility to do what is right, 
just, and fair.”39  Though ethical norms are embodied in both the economic and legal 
responsibilities, this category embodies society’s “expectations of business over and 
above [any] legal requirement.”40  The final category, discretionary or philanthropic 
responsibility, represents society’s expectation that a business should assume social roles 
above and beyond its economic, legal, and ethical responsibilities.41  This could include 
making contributions to “various kinds of social, educational, recreational, or cultural 
purposes.”42 
Of all of the categories, philanthropic responsibility provokes the most debate 
among scholars.43  While it is somewhat inaccurate to label something as both 
discretionary and as a responsibility, Carroll maintained this category as a part of his 
CSR conceptualization because he viewed society as expecting businesses to engage in 
some discretionary activities.44  However, other commentators disagree on the 
discretionary nature of philanthropic activities and instead subsume them under the 
economic and ethical responsibilities, or as being an integral part, rather than a 
discretionary part, of CSR.45  Thus, the debate appears to center on whether CSR includes 
                                                
34 Matten & Moon, supra n. ____, at 405; Archie B. Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of 
Corporate Performance, 4 ACAD. MGT. REV. 497, 497-98 (1979). 
35 See Aviva Geva, Three Models of Corporate Social Responsibility: Interrelationships between Theory, 
Research, and Practice, 113:1 BUS. & SOC. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (referring to Carroll’s article 1979 article on 
CSR as a “foundational article on social performance.”); Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, Corporate 
Citizenship: Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 ACAD. MGT. REV. 166, 167 (2005) 
(noting that Carroll’s 1979 model of CSR is widely cited). 
36 Archie Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, 4 ACAD. MGT. 
REV. 497, 499 (1979); Archie Carroll, The Four Faces of Corporate Citizenship, 100/101 BUS. & SOC. 
REV. 1, 1-2 (1998); Geva, supra n. ___, at 5-7; Matten & Crane, supra n. ___, at 167. 
37 Matten & Crane, supra n. _____, at 167; Carroll, supra n. ____, at 500.  
38 Carroll, supra n. _____, at 500. 
39 Matten & Crane, supra n. 24, at 167. 
40 Carroll, supra n. _____, at 500. 
41 Id. 
42 Matten & Crane, supra n. ____, at 167.  Carroll originally conceptualized these categories into a 
pyramid, and though he claimed they were not mutually exclusive, they were ordered by their “fundamental 
role in the evolution of importance.”  Carroll, supra n. _____, at 499-500.  As a pyramid, economic 
responsibilities were at the bottom, topped by legal responsibilities, then by ethical responsibilities, and 
finally, by discretionary responsibilities at the very top.  Geva, supra n. _____, at 5. 
43 Geva, supra n. _____, at 9. 
44 Carroll, supra n. ____, at 500. 
45 See Geva, supra n. ____, at 6, Table1 (explaining how intersecting and concentric circle models of 
CSR differ from Carroll’s pyramid model). 
 9 
only, as its essential parts, the economic, legal, and ethical responsibilities or whether 
CSR should also include philanthropic activities.46  
Friedman rejected the concept of philanthropic/discretionary giving as essentially 
undemocratic.47  He argued that when a corporate executive spent corporate funds on 
charity, that executive spent the shareholders’ money, via the shareholder’s interest in the 
corporation, for a general social interest.48  Thus, such an executive would essentially be 
imposing a tax on either the customers, through higher prices, or on its own employees in 
the form of lower wages.49  Friedman argued that this imposition of taxes and 
expenditure of assets is a government function that should be left to the legislature to 
impose.50  In contrast, Carroll’s hierarchy simply has philanthropy as a discretionary part 
of CSR. 
This optional view of philanthropic giving contrasts with a second view of CSR, 
which is embodied in a growing trend suggesting that businesses have a responsibility 
beyond their legal and ethical responsibilities.51  As one commentator has noted, 
“[p]hilanthropy, which is usually understood as exceeding this minimum, appears to 
serve as the distinguishing point between the neoclassical economic position and the new 
widely accepted notion of corporate citizenship, which highlights the importance of 
corporate giving.”52  Thus, this newer line of thinking appears to embrace discretionary 
giving as an essential part of CSR, which may be subsumed under the other 
responsibilities.53 
 
3. Legal scholarship views on CSR. 
The above debate mirrors an ongoing one within the legal academic community 
over the role or the corporation within society.  As early as the 1930s, Adolph Berle and 
E. Merrick Dodd debated the idea that a business might wish to aspire to a higher goal 
than simply turning a profit.  Berle took the position that a corporation owes only a duty 
to the shareholders to maximize wealth, while Dodd suggested that the corporation 
should serve a social purpose as well.54  Dodd’s side of this debate has been described by 
some legal academics as Corporate Social Responsibility or CSR.  Thus far, legal 
                                                
46 This concept is sometimes referred to in the business management literature as “corporate citizenship.”  
Matten & Crane, supra n. ___, at 168. 
47 Friedman, supra n. ___, at 38-39. 
48 Id. at 38. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  Friedman also appeared to take the view that CSR was a very narrow category of giving that did 
not benefit the corporation.  Friedman was not critical of a corporation may engaging in charitable giving 
when it provided an advantageous tax deduction or garnered good public relations but noted that it may be 
hypocritical to term such giving as socially responsible.  Id. at 41.  Thus, giving that falls within one of the 
other responsibilities (economic, legal or ethical) arguably appears to be acceptable corporate behavior in 
Friedman’s view. 
51 Geva, supra n. ___, at 9. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 6-9. 
54 Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transactional Law:  The United Nations’ Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in 
International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 298–99 (2006); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of 
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 KAN. L. 
REV. 77, 81 (2002). 
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academics have not uniformly defined CSR.55   As Professor David Engel noted,  “[t]he 
people who say they are discussing corporate social responsibility are by no means all 
interested in the same questions, and they often seem to be talking past each other.”56  
However, generally speaking, most seem to assume a definition similar to the one 
assumed by Milton Friedman; that CSR refers to conducting philanthropic activities at 
the expense of profits.57  This definition of CSR, as Jill Fisch has noted, is “characterized 
by its view that corporations have obligations to non-shareholder stakeholders and the 
public generally, and that these obligations include duties of fairness and morality that 
extend beyond legal and contractual rules.”58  Thus the term CSR is often associated with 
the progressive corporate law proponents, but this actually represents just one side of the 
spectrum in the legal academic debate over the role of CSR.  However, rather than argue 
over how to define CSR, as the business management academics have done, many legal 
academics have simply adopted a view that CSR proponents are advocating for the 
progressive corporate law view-point.59  This progressive corporate law philosophy is 
counter to the shareholder primacy norm which sees the corporation as the property of the 
shareholders and views executives as owing duties primarily to the shareholders, with 
little concern for non-shareholder stakeholders (except to the degree that it would affect 
the shareholders).  Though there are various shades of gray in the debate, for the purposes 
of this article, we will focus our discussion on the shareholder primacy norm and 
Progressive ends of the debate.  
 
a. Shareholder primacy norm 
 At one end of the spectrum is the property conception of the corporation.  The 
corporation is the property of its owners, i.e. the shareholders.  As the directors of a 
corporation are elected by the shareholders, it is their duty, in directing the corporation, to 
do so for the benefit of the shareholders.60  This sentiment was expressed most vividly in 
the 1919 case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.61  In Dodge, the plaintiffs, who were minority 
shareholders in Ford Motor Company, brought suit against the directors to compel the 
issuance of a dividend.62  Despite being in a position to pay generous dividends in 
previous years, in 1916, Henry Ford, who owned 58% of the Ford Motor Company stock, 
declared that no more special dividends would be paid and that the earnings would 
instead be put back into the company.63  Henry Ford announced his motive for this 
decision in a press release, stating, that it was his intention “to employ still more men; to 
spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them 
build up their lives and their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share of our 
                                                
55 David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1979);  
56 Id. 
57 See, e.g., id. at 9-10. 
58 Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes To Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate 
Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1601 (2006). 
59 Arguably, the business management literature has a healthier view of CSR as including responsibilities 
to make a profit which should be balanced with other responsibilities.  See Marks, supra ____, at 1281-83. 
60 Engel, supra n. ____, at 267. 
61 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
62 Id. at 669. 
63 Id. at 670-71. 
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profits back into the business.”64  Based on this and other comments by Henry Ford, the 
plaintiffs sued to enjoin Ford from expanding its operations by building a smelting plant 
and to compel Ford to issue a special dividend.65  After a hearing, the lower court agreed 
with the plaintiffs, enjoined Ford Motor Company’s use of the surplus to expand its 
operations, and ordered a special dividend to be issued.66 
 On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court announced in very clear terms to whom the 
corporation owed its loyalties.67  In reviewing Henry Ford’s testimony as well as legal 
precedence, the court stated, 
There should be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties 
which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general 
public and the duties which in law he and his codirectors owe to 
protesting, minority stockholders.  A business corporation is organized 
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of 
the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is 
to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not 
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to 
other purposes.68 
Though the court reversed an injunction based upon the expansion of Ford’s operations, it 
did affirm a portion of the trial court’s order requiring a distribution of approximately $20 
million of the cash surplus, finding that even with some of the money being diverted to 
the expansion of operations, the surplus was great enough that it was the directors’ duty 
to distribute “a very large sum of money to stockholders” in the form of a dividend.69  
Thus, the Dodge case demonstrates the duty of care owed by corporate directors, and has 
been interpreted as equating this duty with a duty to maximize profits for the benefit of 
the shareholders.70 
This property model is commonly equated with the shareholder primacy norm, in 
that it places the maximization of shareholder wealth above that of more altruistic 
concerns.71  This conception of the corporation is most often aligned with the position of 
Adolph Berle72 (of the Berle/Dodd debate described above) as well as with Milton 
Friedman’s conception of the corporation.73  Indeed, Friedman considered it 
undemocratic for corporate directors to expend corporate monies on charity, as that was a 
role better left to elected representatives.74  However, this view is not necessarily limited 
                                                
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 672-74. 
66 Id. 677-78. 
67 Id. at 683 (“It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the effect of the plan is intended to be . . . to 
continue the corporation henceforth as a semi-eleemosynary institution and not as a business.”). 
68 Id. at 683-84. 
69 Id. at 685. 
70 Engel, supra n. ___, at 268.    
71 D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998).  Smith argues that 
the shareholder primacy norm has mutated from its origins and is “nearly irrelevant to the ordinary business 
decisions of modern corporations.”  Id. at 279. 
72 Adolph A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931). 
73 Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into the Corporate  
Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631, 635-36 (2009). 
74 FRIEDMAN, Social Responsibility, supra n.____, at 38–39. 
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to charitable contributions.  Some scholars have asserted that even legal compliance 
should be tempered by economic concerns.  In a 1982 article by Frank H. Easterbrook 
and Daniel R. Fischel, they urge, in a footnote, that, 
managers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory laws 
just because the laws exist.  They must determine the importance of these 
laws. The penalties Congress names for disobedience are a measure of 
how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules; the 
idea of optimal sanctions is based on the supposition that managers not 
only may but also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.75 
This view is not necessarily consistent with Friedman’s view, however, as even Friedman 
noted that the responsibility to maximize profits was tempered by “conforming to the 
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
custom.”76  Nonetheless, in the context of legal compliance, this focus on profits 
demonstrates the heart of the shareholder primacy norm; though other stakeholders (such 
as employees, customers or the community affected by the corporation) may have claims 
based upon contact or other areas of the law, corporate law’s proper focus is upon the 
interests of the shareholder.77 
 
b. Progressives 
 In response to the shareholder primacy norm, Progressives advocate a broader 
stakeholder model, under which “the corporation serves the interests of all the 
corporation’s stakeholders, including shareholders, but the shareholders do not enjoy 
primacy over other stakeholders.”78  As Professor D. Gordon Smith succinctly describes 
this movement, “[w]hat rankles the progressives is that the descriptive claim [that 
corporations usually operate in the best interests of shareholders] represents a state of 
affairs they find repugnant.  The primary item on the agenda of the progressives, 
therefore, has been to change corporate law in a way that accounts for the needs of 
nonshareholder constituencies.”79 
 Though the origins of the Progressive movement could be found earlier, Merrick 
Dodd’s debate with Berle provides a modern source for this conception of corporate 
purpose.  Dodd stated that “[b]usiness—which is the economic organization of society—
is private property only in a qualified sense, and society may properly demand that it be 
carried on in such a way as to safeguard the interests of those who deal with it either as 
employees or consumers even if the proprietary rights of its owners are thereby 
                                                
75 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. 
REV. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982).  As Professor Cynthia Williams has observed, this view was rejected in an 
initial draft of the American Law Institute’s PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE as “‘premised on a 
false view of the citizen’s duty in a democratic state.’”  Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with 
the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1271-72 (1998) (quoting PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1982)). 
76 FRIEDMAN, Social Responsibility, supra n. ___, at 38-39; Choudhury, supra n. ___, at 667-68. 
77 See Smith, supra n. ___, at 277-78 (“Employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, and others may 
possess contractual claim against the corporation, but shareholders claim the corporation’s heart.”). 
78 Choudhury, supra n. ___, at 665. 
79 Gordon, supra n. ___, at 281. 
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curtailed.”80  This is not to say that the progressive movement in corporate law requires 
corporations to become eleemosynary institutions.  Progressives simply view the 
responsibilities of a corporation as going beyond serving the shareholder’s bottom line.  
Not surprisingly, Progressives reject the law-as-price theory promoted by Easterbrook 
and Fischel, whereby corporations can weigh the consequences of conforming to or 
violating the law and choose violation if the risks are acceptable.81 
 The progressive movement has been criticized by shareholder primacy norm 
proponents as requiring corporate boards to serve two masters — both shareholders and 
stakeholders. 82  Faced with such a choice, corporate managers inevitably must choose 
one over the other—or even worse, neither.  “[A] manager told to serve two masters (a 
little for the equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is 
answerable to neither.”83  Shareholder primacy norm proponents would thus argue that 
the shareholder primacy norm best serves the interests of all stakeholders.84 
 Perhaps in light of this, many commentators have adopted a middle-ground 
approach to CSR.  A common theme to this literature is the concept of “shared values” in 
which corporations should strive to identify areas where they can serve both their own 
interests and the interests of society as well.85  Indeed, one of the authors of this article 
has elsewhere put forth a conception of CSR that would require a balancing of economic, 
legal and ethical interests in any decision-making.86  However, a middle-ground is not 
always conveniently found, and ultimately lines regarding the corporate purpose still 
must be drawn. 
B. CSR at the margins 
 In some areas, such as charitable donations, it is easy, or perhaps easier, to find 
common ground between what is good for society and what is good for the corporate 
bottom line.  Indeed, Friedman appeared to think it hypocritical to recognize such giving 
as CSR because it was self-serving to the corporation.  As Friedman recognized, “it may 
well be in the long run interest of a corporation that is a major employer in a small 
community to devote resources to providing amenities to that community or to improving 
government.  That may make it easier to attract desirable employees, it may reduce the 
wage bill or lessen losses from pilferage and sabotage or have other worthwhile 
effects.”87  But despite Friedman’s reluctance to label such giving as CSR, modern 
academics have seen this arena as one where CSR has the most potential. 
                                                
80 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1162 
(1932). 
81 Se, generally, Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 
N. C. L. REV. 1265 (1998). 
82 David G. Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 253, 296 (2009). 
83 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 
(Harv. Univ. Press 1996). 
84 Yosifon, supra n. ___, at 258-59. 
85 See, e.g., Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, profitability, and a New Paradigm for 
Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 989-90 (2009); Margaret M. Blair, Director’s Duties in a 
Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 885, 885 (2003).  See also Choudury, 
supra n. ___, at 631-34. 
86 Marks & Rapoport, supra n. _____, at 1281-83. 
87 FRIEDMAN, supra n. ____, at ____. 
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 However, there are a number of areas where the goals of society are adverse to, or 
at least do not necessarily align with, corporate interests.  One glaring example is in the 
arena of legal compliance.  Should corporations, as Easterbrook and Fischel have argued, 
weigh the costs of legal compliance with the risks of getting caught and the severity of 
the penalty imposed?  A hypothetical may help illustrate this point. 
 A Better Crop, Inc. (“ABC”) is a produce wholesaler with its headquarters in 
California.  ABC sells produce, such as lettuce, tomatoes, and other fruits and vegetables 
to retail grocers.  The primary pesticide used by ABC on its farms (and its contracted 
farms) is XYZ, which has been the subject of recent studies regarding autism.  Though 
there is some preliminary data correlating the pesticide to autism, the evidence is vague 
and no causal link has yet been shown.  Nonetheless, in response to these studies, 
California imposes a ban on the use of XYZ on commercial farms.  However, the fine 
imposed for violating the ban is small and it is doubtful that it will be strictly enforced.  
Though ABC is concerned about the possible negative publicity should their abuses come 
to light, the cost of switching from XYZ to another pesticide would increase the prices 
they would have to charge for produce by 15%.  If ABC went pesticide-free, they would 
have to charge an additional 20% to account for the loss in crops.  Both options will 
likely drive down consumption of ABC’s products and hurt ABC’s bottom line.  Should 
ABC take the risk of getting caught, as it is still more profitable to use XYZ? 
 Such a hypothetical brings into stark contrast the contradicting goals of society and 
the corporation.  Accepting that society imposes such fines where it finds the conduct in 
question objectionable, then should corporations, which owe their very existence to the 
State in the first place, respect such laws?  Or is the severity of the fine a reflection of 
how reprehensible society finds the conduct?  In other, words, if society was serious 
about such abuses, would it not create a more severe punishment and stricter enforcement 
provisions?  However, even if this is true, could not the corporation, wielding its power 
and influence, lobby to ensure a light fine or penalty so that the costs of noncompliance 
are negligible? 
 This brings up yet another area where the diverging views of CSR are brought into 
conflict.  As Professor Jill Fisch has pointed out, the corporation, unlike the Holmesian 
“bad man,” has the ability to ensure that its conduct is not illegal through lobbying 
efforts.88  Under a shareholder primacy norm, corporations should use such lobbying 
powers to benefit the corporation’s bottom line (and thus benefit its shareholders).  This 
power has come into even greater focus with the recent Supreme Court decision of 
Citizens United v. FEC.89 
 In Citizens United, the nonprofit corporation, Citizens United (“CU”), produced 
and distributed a movie critical of 2008 presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.90  The 90-
minute movie titled Hillary: The Movie, was released in theaters and on DVD leading-up 
to the 2008 election primary.91  CU was also approached to release the movie on pay-per-
view, with CU paying $1.2 million to do so.92  CU intended the movie to be viewed free 
                                                
88 Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate 
Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1608-09 (2006). 
89 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
90 Id. at 886-87. 
91 Id. at 887.  Coincidentally, the movie referred to Clinton as “Machiavellian.”  Id. at 890. 
92 Id. 
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of charge,93 but doing so put CU at risk of running afoul of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which prohibited corporations from either using general 
treasury funds to make direct contributions to candidates or from making “independent 
expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any 
form of media, in connection with certain qualified federal elections.”94  Thus CU sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief from the Federal Elections Commission challenging the 
constitutionality of the BCRA with regards to both the prohibition on this type of speech 
as well as the disclaimer and disclosure requirements.95 
 The lower courts denied relief based upon stare decisis as the Supreme Court had 
previously upheld the constitutionality of the BCRA96 in McConnell v. FEC97 and Austin 
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.98  On appeal, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, 
overturned McConnell and Austin and found the BCRA’s prohibition on corporate 
political speech unconstitutional.99  Among the concerns raised by the government on 
appeal was that allowing corporations to take part in such political speech would open the 
door to corruption.100  The Court, however, was not so concerned based on the record 
before it, stating: 
When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding due 
deference; but Congress may not choose an unconstitutional remedy. If 
elected officials succumb to improper influences from independent 
expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put 
expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for concern. We 
must give weight to attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either the 
appearance or the reality of these influences. The remedies enacted by 
law, however, must comply with the First Amendment; and, it is our law 
and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing rule. An 
outright ban on corporate political speech during the critical preelection 
period is not a permissible remedy. Here Congress has created categorical 
bans on speech that are asymmetrical to preventing quid pro quo 
corruption.101 
The Court concluded that “[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the 
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”102  The Court did uphold, 
however, the BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure requirements.103 
 This new holding brings into even sharper focus the power the corporation has to 
influence government.  As Professor Erik Gerding commented soon after the decision, 
“[f]rom a pure descriptive standpoint, after the Citizens United decision, it seems 
impossible to argue that these spheres [corporations and government] can be neatly 
                                                
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 887-88. 
95 Id. at 888. 
96 Id. at 888. 
97 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
98 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
99 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
100 Id. at 908-09. 
101 Id. at 911. 
102 Id. at 913. 
103 Id. at 916. 
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separated. Corporations are not just playing by the rules, they have the right to participate 
in setting them. Moreover, they may be the 800 lb gorilla in the room.”104  The problem 
the progressive movement faces with regard to lobbying and free speech actions is that 
the corporation has no ability, in and of itself, to weigh right from wrong and it is 
questionable, in some circumstances, what does best advance societal goals.105  
Ultimately, because of this lack of corporate conscience, the corporation must rely upon 
its agents, i.e. the board of directors and its officers.  Thus, in such areas, CSR comes 
down to how those individuals view the corporate purpose and their roles in pursuit of 
that corporate purpose.  Thus a review of two classic works on the nature of power and 
how it should or could be wielded can offer insight into the nature of corporate governing 
and CSR. 
 
III.  Corporations and Business Ethics of the Past: Plato, Machiavelli, and the 
City State. 
 
 Given the corporation’s reliance on its agents, namely, the CEO, other corporate 
officers, and the Board of Directors, it is helpful for CSR scholarship to determine how 
corporate agents might use corporate assets, for what purpose, and what might influence 
their behavior.  Utilitarian theory, with its emphasis on maximizing “happiness,” together 
with classic economic theory, has been important in providing ethical underpinnings for 
the shareholder primacy position.106  However, most Progressive commentators adhere to 
a more Kantian point of view, which focuses on determining what is “right” or “good” 
objectively and then determining whether an action falls within that measurement.107  
Both the Utilitarian and Kantian approaches are problematic.  As is clear from the 
discussion above, proponents of the shareholder primacy norm do not believe that CSR 
adds anything meaningful, and is at best a distraction, at worst a violation of the fiduciary 
duties corporate officers owe the shareholders.  Likewise, the Progressive position 
preordains that CSR, particularly its philanthropic aspects, should be followed.  As 
Professor Smith’s quote above makes clear, the notion that the pursuit of wealth for its 
own sake is viewed as inappropriate, if not ethically reprehensible. 
 The Utilitarian/Kantian dichotomy, while useful, puts all sides of the CSR debate into 
set positions.108  However, there is a third branch of Western philosophical thought which 
argues that social goals are best pursued by defining characteristics people should have, 
                                                
104 Erik Gerding, The Conglomerate Blog, January 23, 2010, available at 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/01/google-china-and-citizens-united-a-short-essay-on-power-and-
corporations.html. 
105 Fisch, supra n. _____, at 1603; Marks, supra n._____, at 1149. 
106 GEORGE P. FLETCHER BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 144 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) 
(describing utilitarianism thusly: “The most common mode of moral reasoning in the Anglo-American 
tradition is cost/benefit analysis – the “balancing” of competing advantages and disadvantages of adopting 
particular courses of action.”). 
107 Id. at 146-51, 149 (“In the end Kant’s moral teaching demands purity from all of us.”). 
108 We understand that this is somewhat of an oversimplification of the dichotomy and that arguments 
could certainly be made that Progressives also follow a global utilitarian model in that corporations should 
maximize the happiness of society if it outweighs the pain inflicted upon itself.  A full discussion of the 
Utilitarian/Kantian dichotomy is beyond the scope of this article (we feel we have our hands full with the 
narrower topic at hand) but feel it is at least important to recognize the link between these philosophical 
schools of thought and modern approaches to CSR. 
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especially the characteristics of rulers. Two of the most important works that follow this 
approach are Plato’s The Republic and Machiavelli’s The Prince.   These works may 
allow better insight into how corporate actors would and should use CSR.  As a first step, 
we need to address whether it is actually valid to compare the City-States of Ancient 
Greece and Renaissance Italy with the modern corporation.  
 
A. The City State and the Modern Corporation, A Comparison 
1. The Problems of Governance  
 Both The Prince and The Republic are tracts of political theory.  They are concerned 
with the mechanics of government, namely, how should rulers rule.  But why should we 
look to them for guidance on corporate conduct?  Corporations are, after all, creatures of 
government, subject to governments, not governments themselves.109   
 The answer lies in the fact that corporations are created for the same purposes as the 
city-state: as a “response to human needs.”110  Plato states that in nature each person had 
to see to his own needs.111  Eventually, it was seen that it was better for a person to 
concentrate his efforts on producing that for which he has a talent.112  Plato goes on to 
explain:  
Since each person has many wants, many partners and purveyors will be 
required to furnish them.  One person will turn to another to supply a 
particular want, and for a different want or need he will seek out still 
another.  Owing to this interchange of services, a multitude of persons will 
gather and dwell together in what we have to come to call the city or the 
state.113 
According to Plato, the scope and size of the city-state expands as new specialties are 
identified and new groups of specialists join the population to meet the needs of those 
who desire them.  First, the basic necessities are met: food, shelter, and clothing.114  The 
producers of these goods are further subdivided (weavers, shoemakers, carpenters, 
smiths, and other craftsmen), then a network of distributors (merchants) is introduced, as 
well as transporters.115  Eventually, the city state will become so large that very particular 
specialists will be needed who are capable of protecting friends, guarding against 
enemies, and have the wisdom to do so in all its aspects, not just on the field of battle.116  
Plato calls such people “guardians.”117   
                                                
109  See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)  
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties 
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its 
very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for 
which it was created . . . . But this being does not share in the civil government of the 
country, unless that be the purpose for which it was created. (Marshall, C.J.). 
110  THE REPUBLIC, 369b (p. 64). 
111  Id. at ___ (p. 64) 
112  Id. at 369e-370a (p. 65) 
113  Id. at 369c (p. 64). 
114  Id. at 369d (p. 65). 
115  Id. at 370c-371b (pp. 66-67). 
116  THE REPUBLIC, supra n. ___, at 375a-376c (pp. 70-72). 
117  Id. at 374d-e (p. 70). 
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 Machiavelli’s description of the rise of the state is also rooted in basic human need: 
“for in the beginning of the world, the inhabitants being few, they lived dispersed for a 
time in the manner of beasts.  Then, as the population increased, they drew together . . . 
the better to defend themselves.”118  In short, the state was formed to promote human 
welfare.  According to Machiavelli the leader of the state “must provide in such a way 
that, in whatever circumstances, the citizens will always be in need of him and his 
government.  Then they will always be loyal to him.”119  As we all well know, 
Machiavelli calls such people “The Prince.”120  
 For a compelling comparison of the ancient and renaissance city-state with the 
modern corporation, consider Peter Drucker’s The Concept of the Corporation.   
Drucker’s description of the purpose of a corporation closely aligns with Plato’s and 
Machiavelli’s description of the state: “When we say that the corporation is an institution 
we say that, like any institution, it is an instrument for the organization of human efforts 
to a common end.”121  Drucker, like Plato and Machiavielli, considers leadership a 
paramount concern: 
 [T]he large corporation is in no way different from an army; it must 
have the equipment but also, as in the army, equipment is of no avail 
without the functional organization of human effort.  And like the army or 
like any other social institution, the things that really count are not the 
individual members but the relations of command and responsibility 
among them.122 
As with every other institution, the survival and successful functioning of 
the corporation depends on the solution of three interdependent problems . 
. . Of these problems, the decisive one, particularly in the corporation, is 
the problem of leadership. . . . No institution can possibly survive if it 
needs geniuses or supermen to manage it.123 
                                                
118  Niccolo Machiavelli, THE DISCOURSES (Daniel Donno, tr. 1966) Book I, Chapter 2 (p. 102) (contained 
in THE PRINCE, supra n. ___ ). 
119  THE PRINCE, supra n. ___, at Chapter 9 (p. 46). 
120  Id. at Chapter 1 (p. 16). 
121  PETER DRUCKER THE CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION (1993 edition) 20 (1946).  Also consider the 
Code of Conduct for Google, Inc., which states “[o]ur products, features and services should make Google 
more useful for all our users, whether they're searching, advertising or posting content, and whether they're 
large corporations or individuals. We have many different types of users, but one guiding principle: 'Is what 
we are offering useful?'”  Google Code of Conduct Part I.b. available at 
http://investor.google.com/corporate/code-of-conduct.html.  
122 Drucker, supra n. ___  at 25-26.  It is interesting to note that Drucker’s purpose in some ways was also 
similar to Machiavelli: the preservation of the corporation, “[I]t is the organization which the corporation 
must maintain and the survival of which is the supreme law. . . and makes survival all the more the measure 
of all its actions and decisions.”  Id. at 26. 
123 Drucker, supra n. ___ at 2It may seem that Drucker argues against a Prince as Machiavilli envisions 
him.  But Machiavelli clearly envisioned the Prince having a management team (Machiavelli himself 
aspired to be part of Lorezo di Medici’s in Florence): 
 [T]here is no way of avoiding flattery except by letting men know that they will not 
offend by telling the truth; yet if every man is free to tell you the truth, you will not 
receive due respect. 
 Therefore a prudent prince will pursue a third course, choosing the wise men of his 
state and granting only to them the freedom to tell him the truth, but only concerning 
those matter about which he asks, and no others.  Yet he should question them about all 
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While this is admittedly a very cursory examination of the parallels between the modern 
corporation and the city-state, it is clear that both the state and the corporation are 
institutions created for the purpose of human welfare and face similar leadership 
questions. 
 
2.  The Comparison of the Governed 
 
 Given that there were no corporations in either Machiavelli’s or Plato’s era, 
philosophical ideals regarding governing city-states and poleis provide us with the closest 
analogies in terms of population and economic power.124  Indeed, the size of some 
corporations dwarf even the largest of the city-states and poleis: Walmart employs over 2 
million people world-wide125 and recorded $13.4 billion in profits in 2009;126 Microsoft 
employs 88,124 people world-wide127 and recorded $17.23 billion in profits in 2009;128 
Exxon Mobil reports to employ nearly 80,000 world-wide129 and recorded $45.22 billion 
in 2009.130  While shareholder numbers for these corporations are difficult to ascertain 
due to the constant trading of stocks, Walmart has over 3 billion shares outstanding,131 
Microsoft has in excess of 8 billion shares outstanding,132 and Exxon Mobil has over 4 
billion shares outstanding.133  Therefore, it seems certain these companies have thousands 
of shareholders and perhaps even millions. 
 Compare these corporation numbers to those of the poleis and city-states during 
Plato’s and Machiavelli’s time.  Plato lived from 428-348 B.C.E. and though population 
estimates from this time period are scant, data does exist for some of the poleis.134  For 
instance, the polis of Mantinea, which occupied an area of roughly 295 km,135 did not 
have more than 3,000 people as of 420 B.C.E.136  It has been estimated that in 318 B.C.E. 
                                                                                                                                            
matters, listen to their opinions, and then decide for himself as he wishes.  He should treat 
these councils and the individual advisers in such a way as to make it clear that their 
words will be the more welcome the more freely they are spoken.  Except for these men, 
he should listen to no one, but rather pursue the course agreed upon and do so resolutely.   
THE PRINCE, supra n. ___, at Chapter 23 (p. 88). 
124The comparison is particularly apt given the economic power multi-national corporations wield.  One 
oft cited 2000 study revealed that of the top 100 economies in the world, 51 were corporations.  See Sarah 
Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Corporate Global Power 3, available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/top200.pdf; Benjamin J. Richardson, Reforming 
Climate Finance Through Investment Codes of Conduct, 27 WIS. INT’L L. J. 483, n. 8 (2009). 
125 See http://investors.walmartstores.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=112761&p=irol-faq  
126 See http://www.forbes.com/lists.2009/18/global-09_The-Global-2000_Rank.html  
127 See http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/inside_ms.mspx  
128 See http://www.forbes.com/lists.2009/18/global-09_The-Global-2000_Rank.html  
129 See http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/about_who_workforce.aspx  
130 See http://www.forbes.com/lists.2009/18/global-09_The-Global-2000_Rank.html 
131 See http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s=WMT+Key+Statistics  
132 See http://www.microsoft.com/msft/FAQ/stock.mspx  
133 See http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s=xom  
134  HANSEN & NIELSEN, AN INVENTORY OF ARCHAIC AND CLASSICAL POLEIS 8 (Oxford Press 2004).  
These numbers generally come from army figures, which give a “rough idea of the number of adult male 
citizens of military age who are fit for military service.”  Id. 
135  Id. at 518. 
136  Id. (noting that “it is not possible to give any exact estimate of the size of the population on this 
basis”). 
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Megale polis’s population was around 65,000.137  And when the territory of Thebes was 
conquered and razed to the ground in 335 B.C.E. by Alexander the Great, more than 
6,000 men were killed, and the remaining population of 30,000 men, women, and 
children were sold into slavery.138  Machiavelli lived from 1469-1527 C.E. and the 
population data from his life is likewise approximate, but according to one source, the 
estimated population of all of Italy in 1450 C.E. was only 7,500,000 people.139  
According to another source, 50 years later the estimate was 10,500,000 people.140  As 
Italy was not unified until 1861, these population numbers are distributed among as many 
as nineteen autonomous regions. 
 
B. Machiavelli’s Prince and Doing What is Necessary 
 
 It is important to recognize that Niccolo Machiavelli wrote The Prince with one 
primary goal in mind—it was in fact a naked attempt to get into the good graces of 
Lorenzo Medici.141  It was also a failure in that regard.142  It is often overlooked that his 
advocacy for a monarchy may well have been more the act of a courtier than a reflection 
of his political beliefs.143 
 Notwithstanding these caveats, Machiavelli’s advice is as relevant to corporate CEOs 
as it was to Medici.  Consider: 
                                                
137  Id. 
138  Id. at 455. 
139  RUSSELL, THE FONTANA ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE: POPULATION IN EUROPE 500-1500 19 
(Fontana Books 1969). 
140  BRADY ET AL, HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 1400-1600: LATE MIDDLE AGES, 
RENAISSANCE, AND REFORMATION 13 (E.J. Brill 1994). 
141  THE PRINCE, supra n. 11,  at 5-6 (Translator’s Introduction).  “I . . . have composed a little book, De 
Principatibus . . . to a prince– especially a new prince–it ought to be welcome.  Therefore I am addressing it 
to the Magnificent Giuliano . . . .There is my wish that these Medici lords would begin to use me, even if 
they were to start by setting me to roll a stone.”  (letter to Francesco Vittori, December 10, 1513).  See also 
THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MACHIAVELLI xix (Editor’s note) (Peter Constantine ed. & translator, 
Random House 2007). 
 The Lorenzo Medici here is not Lorenzo the Magnificent, who died in 1492.  It is instead, his 
grandson.  Originally, The Prince was to be dedicated to Giuliano Medici, Lorenzo the Magnificent’s son, 
who died in 1516.  THE PRINCE, supra n.___ at Dedication (p. 16), n. 1 (p. 135). 
142 This failure could not have been unexpected.  After all, he had been tortured in January of 1513 on 
suspicion of seeking the overthrow of the Medici government.  
143  There has never been any doubt among the students of Machiavelli that he believed in republican 
government over monarchies.  Rousseau believed the book to be a subversive writing,  
Machiavelli was a gentleman and a good citizen; but being attached to the house of 
Medici, he was forced during the oppression of his country to disguise his love of liberty.  
The very choice of an execrable hero [Cesare Borgia] reveals his secret intention, and the 
antithesis between his principles in his book The Prince and those in his Discourses on 
Livy and The History of Florence proves that this profound political thinker has so far had 
only superficial or corrupted readers.  The Pope’s court strictly prohibited his book, 
which I can well believe, since that was the Court he depicts most plainly. 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Maurice Cranston, tr. 1968, Penguin Books), Book III, 
p. 118, n.___(1762)  Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist,  went so far as to argue THE PRINCE was a proto-
revolutionary work, as it exposes the tactics of the rulers to the common people.  ANTONIO GRAMSCI THE 
MODERN PRINCE AND OTHER WRITINGS  ___ (Louis Marks, tr. 1957). 
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Wisely pursued, the advice I have given above will make a new prince 
appear to have been long established in his state, and it will bind him more 
securely and more firmly to it than if he had actually been long established 
there.  The actions of the new prince are. . .closely watched. . .and when 
they are recognized to be fitting and able, they win men over and compel 
their allegiance more than ancient lineage does; for men are more taken 
with the present than with the past.  When they find themselves well off in 
the present, they enjoy it and seek nothing more.  Indeed, so long as the 
prince does not neglect his duties, they will undertake to defend him in 
every way.144 
 This was an explicit reminder to Medici that his family had only been back in power 
for a very short time, and had conquered Florence with a Spanish Army.145  The 
Florentines were not used to his rule and might decide to revolt again, as they had 18 
years before.  Such can be said to be similar for the CEO, with Directors and 
Shareholders always looking over his shoulder.  Follow my advice, says Machiavelli, and 
you will thrive, and your state (corporation) with you. 
 The Prince is divided into three parts.  The first part essentially lists all the different 
ways a man may become a prince: through inheritance, through force of arms, by evil 
means, or by religious office146 and is not germane to this article.  The second part 
concerns what a ruler should do to hold onto power once acquired.147  The final part was 
an argument for what should happen next in Florence and on the Italian Peninsula.148 
 We will focus on the second part of The Prince, which is about maintaining power 
and furthering goals, particularly the goals of personal and political survival.  According 
to Machiavelli, order is the only way to ensure social stability, and the key to order is a 
strong ruler.  One of his key points is that moral obligations should not stand in the way 
of survival. 
Many men have imagined republics and principalities that never really 
existed at all.  Yet the way men live is so far removed from the way they 
ought to live that anyone who abandons what is for what should be 
pursues his downfall rather than his preservation; for a man who strives 
after goodness in all his acts is sure to come to ruin, since there are so 
many men who are not good.  Hence it is necessary that a prince who is 
interested in his survival learn to be other than good, making use of this 
capacity or refraining from it according to need.149 
                                                
144  THE PRINCE, supra n. 11, Chapter 24 (p. 89-90). 
145  Id. at 3.  The former regime, which Machiavelli was part of, had lost a war and been turned out by the 
Medic dynasty.  The Medici had backed the winning side in a larger war for control over Italy, and 
essentially sought Florence as a spoil after an 18 year absence.  Id. 
146  Id. at Chapters 1-11 (pp. 16-51). 
147  Id. at Chapters  12-23 (pp. 51-89). 
148  Id. at  Chapters 24-26 (pp. 89-97). 
149  Id. at Chapter 15 (pp. 61-62).  There can really be no doubt that Machiavelli was thinking of Plato, 
among others.  However, as will be discussed below, Plato’s focus was just as much on the injustice he was  
describing as it was on the perfect city that never existed.  Machiavelli did not have any problems with 
goodness as such.  However, he did not really have much problem with vice either.  To wit: 
Everyone will admit that it would be very praiseworthy if a prince had all those above 
named qualities that are deemed good; but since he cannot have them, nor devotedly 
adhere to them, because human conditions will not permit, he must be sufficiently 
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 Machiavelli discusses two issues of relevance for the modern corporate officer: 
Should the Prince be virtuous? And what should his spending policies be with regard to 
virtue?  Whether one should be virtuous, Machiavelli argues, depends on to what degree 
it helps the prince, and through him, the state, survive and thrive.  As he states: 
How praiseworthy it is that a prince keeps his word and governs by candor 
instead of craft, everyone knows.  Yet the experience of our own time 
shows that those princes who had little regard for their word and had the 
craftiness to turn men’s minds have accomplished great things. . . 
.Therefore a prince will not actually need to have all the qualities 
previously mentioned, but he must surely seem to have them.  Indeed, I 
would go so far as to say that having them all and always conforming to 
them would be harmful, while appearing to have them would be useful.150 
 At the same time, the prince cannot give into his appetites.  He should always appear 
to be, and actually be, virtuous, whenever possible.151  The prince should discard virtue 
only when it is required, not because he can.152  The reason for this is straight-forward: 
the prince cannot afford to be hated.153 If a prince is hated, then the population has no 
reason for him (and by extension his state) to survive. 
 The activities of a prince are not solely concerned with following high moral 
standards.  At some point, money must be spent.  Of course, there are necessary 
expenditures - the government’s servants must be paid, defenses must be maintained, and 
so forth.  Yet, some spending is a matter of the prince’s discretion.  Such spending has no 
purpose other than enhancing the prince’s reputation.  Machiavelli argues that the prince 
must be careful with his money: 
I say that it would be well to be reputed generous.  Yet to be so generous 
as to gain a reputation for this quality is harmful.…To be reputed generous 
among men, one must indulge in every form of ostentation, with the result 
that any prince who does so will have to spend all of his resources and, to 
keep up his reputation, will have to burden his people unduly by resorting 
to extortionate taxation and every other means of raising 
                                                                                                                                            
prudent to avoid a reputation for those vices which would deprive him of his state and, if 
possible, also avoid those that would not deprive him of it.  In case he is unable to avoid 
these last, however, he need not be overly concerned.  Moreover, he need not be 
concerned if he acquires a reputation for those vices without which he would be unlikely 
to save his state.  For, everything considered, he will find things which, though seeming 
good, will lead to his ruin if pursued, and others which, though seeming evil, will result 
in his safety and well-being. 
Id. at 62. 
150  THE PRINCE, supra n. 11, at Ch. 18 (p. 68-69). 
151  “Therefore, a prince will not actually need to have all the qualities previously mentioned, but he must 
surely seem to have them.…That is, it will be well for him to seem and, actually, to be merciful, faithful, 
humane, frank, and religious.  But he should preserve a disposition which will make a reversal of conduct 
possible in case the need arises.”  Id. (at 69). 
152 Id. 
153 “Of all the things [the prince] must guard against, hatred and contempt come first…”  Id. at Chapter 16, 
(p. 64).  “Still a prince should make himself feared in such a way that, though he does not gain love, he 
escapes hatred….”  Id. at Ch. 17 (p. 66).  
 It is interesting to note that Machiavelli sees the chief cause for hatred for the prince is seizing the 
property of his subjects.  “[A]bove all, he should refrain from the property of others, for men are quicker to 
forget the death of a father than the loss of a patrimony.”  Id. 
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funds.…Therefore, being unable to assume the virtue of liberality so that it 
will be recognized and yet create no danger, a wise prince will not object 
to being reputed a miser.154 
However, Machiavelli recognized that many notable rulers in the past, Cyrus, 
Alexander, and Julius Caesar were seen as generous.  The key, argued Machiavelli, was 
whether the prince was spending his own money, his subjects’ money, or someone 
else’s.155  If it was his or her subjects’ own funds, the prince must be frugal, lest he face 
the choice of being either “poor and contemptible, or, to escape poverty, become[ing] 
rapacious and hateful.”156  On the other hand, if the funds being spent are from another 
source, such as bounty from pillaging and extorting conquered lands, then there is no 
reason for the prince not to be generous, especially to his army.157 
 Machiavelli saw the prince’s ability to stay in power as a balancing act between doing 
what was required to stay in power, but not doing so much as to be despised for it.  
Ultimately, however, Machiavelli condones any action of a prince that keeps him in 
power; only failure is unforgivable.158  In this way, Machiavelli mirrors much of Ancient 
Greek thought, particularly that of 5th Century Athens B.C.E. prior to its defeat in the 
Peloponnesian Wars.  Machiavelli, it must be remembered, aspired for a prince who 
could free Italy from its foreign occupation.159  Anything that could accomplish this 
would, in his view, be seen as good and be appropriately rewarded by all.160  This is 
consistent with the Athenian perspective that looked to external accomplishments to 
                                                
154  THE PRINCE, supra n. 11, at Chapter 16 (p. 63). 
155  Id. at Ch. 16 (p. 64).   
156  Id. at Ch. 16. (p. 64). 
157  Id.  This particular aspect of Machiavelli’s thought is particularly relevant depending how corporate 
officers view the corporations’ assets as belonging to themselves along with the shareholders, or if they 
view the shareholders property as something they “handle.” 
158  Condsider:  
One could cite a host of modern examples and list the many peace treaties, the 
many promises that were made null and void by princes who broke faith, with 
the advantage going to the one who best knew how to play the fox.  But one 
must know how to mask this nature skillfully and be a great dissembler.  Men 
are so simple and so much inclined to obey immediate needs that a deceiver will 
never lack victims for his deception.  Of recent examples proving this, there is 
one I will not omit.  Pope Alexander VI never gave thought to anything but 
deception and never lacked someone on whom to practice it.  There never was a 
man who made promises more persuasively or swore to them more solemnly 
and kept so few of them as he.  Yet his tricks always brought the results he 
desired, for he knew this side of the world well. 
Id. at Chapter 18 (pp. 68-69). 
159  Id. at Chapter 26 (pp. 94-97).   
160  Id. at 97 
This opportunity, therefore, must not be allowed to pass, so that Italy after so 
long a time may find her redeemer.  I cannot describe with how much love, with 
what thirst for revenge, with what resolute loyalty, with what tenderness, with 
what tears he would be received in all those provinces which have endured these 
foreign hordes.  What gates would be closed to him?  What people would deny 
him obedience?  Whose envy would oppose him?  What Italian would withhold 
his allegiance? 
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indicate individual and societal excellence.161  In this view, if the end is met, any means 
to obtain it are justified.  The most important response to this is unquestionably  Plato’s 
Republic. 
 
C. The Platonic Alternative 
 Since The Prince is a purely political tract, and The Republic a largely ethical one, 
how can Plato be seen as responding to Machiavellian theory?  To answer this question, 
we will examine the similarities in the political situations of the two periods.  After that, 
we will examine Plato’s response to the Ancient Greek mindset (and by extension 
Machiavelli).   
 
1. Plato’s Greece and Machiavelli’s Italy 
 The Republic was written sometime between 380 and 360 B.C.E. in Athens.  At that 
time, the Greek city-states were in the middle of a century of intercity warfare.  It began 
with the Second Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C.E, and ended with the loss of Greek 
independence to Macedon in 336 B.C.E. after the Battle of Chaeronea.162  Within Plato’s 
lifetime, he saw the destruction of the Athenian Empire and the weakening of the entire 
Greek peninsula as Phillip II sought his own hegemony.163  Plato’s ultimate conclusion 
was that, whether by base appetite or incorrect morality, the constant drive to victory, by 
individuals or individual city-states with no concern for the consequences of ceaseless 
war, was destroying his country.164  He wrote The Republic in part, to address his 
concerns and propose a solution. 
 Machiavelli’s Italy, especially Florence, was equally war-torn.  With the end of the 
Hundred Years War in France in 1453 and the Conquest of Granada in Spain in 1492, the 
rulers of those two nations turned to the Italian peninsula to fight proxy wars.  In 
Florence, Machiavelli watched the destruction of the old order with the invasion of 
Charles VII of France, saw Savanorola’s extreme religious theocracy ended with an auto 
de fe, the rise and fall of an oligarchical republic (for which Machiavelli served as 
Secretary to the Second Chancery of the Signoria) under Pier Soderini, and the return of 
the Medici at the head of a Spanish army.165  What happened in Florence was going on 
elsewhere in the Peninsula, and Machiavelli saw Italy as “more enslaved than the 
Hebrews, more servile than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians, leaderless, 
disordered, beaten, despoiled, bruised, trampled, subject to every kind of injury.”166 
 
2. The Republic 
                                                
161  See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE WHOSE JUSTICE?  WHICH RATIONALITY? 12-46 (Chapters II-III) (1988) for 
an extensive discussion of this point. 
162  THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 242-53 (v. 20, 15th ed. 2002). 
163  Id. 
164  E.g., THE REPUBLIC, supra n. ____, at 278b-c (pp. 74-75) (“Nor can we permit it to be said that the 
gods plot against the gods and make war upon each other–which is in any case false–if we want our future 
guardians to abhor eve the thought of quarreling among themselves.…If we could get them to believe us, 
we would tell our future guardians that quarreling is a blasphemy, and we would say that to this day there 
has never been a quarrel among citizens.”).  
165  THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 215-19 (v. 22, 15th ed. 2002). 
166  THE PRINCE, supra n. ____, at Chapter 26 (pp. 94-95). 
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 The Republic and The Prince, then, both arose from times of extreme social 
instability.  Yet the authors came up with very different solutions.  Plato argued that, 
contrary to common belief, tough times do not require “tough” leaders, but that such 
leaders are actually responsible for the hardships of the populace.  Machiavelli, as already 
discussed, argued that it would be best for a leader to establish himself in power and then 
devote his energies to staying there, as stability would be better for the populace at large 
than the chaos of constant upheaval.167   
 In Book I of The Republic, Socrates is attending a religious festival and visits the 
home of an old friend.168  Through his dialogue with his companions, Socrates proposes 
the following theory: the unjust man will harm both the just and the unjust in pursuit of 
his own gains, while the just man harms only the unjust who would harm others or 
himself.169  He further argues that injustice can never be profitable, as those who are 
unjust cannot help but to conduct their lives badly, while those who are just govern their 
lives well, and by extension, live well.170 
 In Book II of The Republic, Plato begins to address directly the issues that 
Machiavelli would later raise in The Prince.  Here, Socrates is confronted by Glaucon and 
Adeimantus, who present arguments about the type of person who is successful in 
becoming a leader of the city.  Consider the following in light of our discussion of The 
Prince: 
Perfect Injustice denotes the perfectly unjust man. . .He must be allowed 
to enjoy the greatest reputation for justice all the while he is committing 
the greatest wrongs.  If by mistake any of his misdeeds should become 
known, he must be endowed with ample powers of persuasion so that he 
can cover them up.  Should he need to use force, let him do so with 
boldness and manly strength–and by mobilizing friends and money.171 
 
You know well how fathers lecture theirs sons (and guardians their 
charges) about man’s obligation and also how they use words that 
compliment not justice but the good repute that comes with it.   They 
calculate that a reputation for justice will gain a man public office and 
fortunate alliances and all the things that Glaucon already said would 
accrue to the unjust man who wears the cloak of righteousness.172   
These arguments on the success of the unjust man were presented as a goad to 
Socrates, to dare him to respond to the success of figures who had brought Athens and 
Greek society as a whole into crisis.173   
                                                
167  Id. at Chapter 24 (pp. 89-90). 
168  THE REPUBLIC, supra n. ____, at 327 (p. 26). 
169  Id. at 350d-354b (p. 48-52). 
170  Id. at 353d-358a (p. 52). 
171  THE REPUBLIC, supra n. _____, at 361a-b (p. 56-57). 
172  Id. at 363a (p. 58). 
173  Id. at 367c-d (p. 63) 
You have said that justice belongs to that highest class of good things which not only 
produce good effects but which are, above all, valuable in themselves.…So tell us how 
justice benefits a man intrinsically, and in the same way how injustice harms him.  Let 
others praise or blame the respective rewards and reputations.…I repeat, then, disregard 
outward appearances, and prove to us that justice is better than injustice by showing us 
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 Socrates, as described by Plato, was up to the challenge.  However, he goes about 
making his argument in a less than direct route.  If the question is, “what is the just or 
unjust man?”, Socrates says that we should first determine what makes a just or unjust 
city, on the theory that we may “read the large letters first then check the smaller letters 
against them to see if they correspond.”174 
 For Plato, the ruler epitomized by Machiavelli’s prince was the embodiment of the 
worst possible person, the tyrant.  The tyrant, according to Plato, arises when people, 
fearing the loss of their goods in the face of a perceived evil, choose a protector.175  This 
is much the role that Machiavelli sees the prince playing.176  However, Plato views the 
arrival of the tyrant not as a good, but as the final disaster.177  Rather than protecting the 
people, he enslaves them, takes all steps necessary to secure his power and feed his 
appetites, and in the search for new conquests create pretexts to make war, thus making 
the very people who chose him even less safe than before.178  Unlike Machiavelli’s 
prince, having secured power the tyrant is unconcerned with even the appearance of 
virtue, since he views his subjects as potential threats to his rule.179 
                                                                                                                                            
the effects each has on a man’s should and how and why each effect can properly be 
called good or evil. 
174  Id. at 368d (p. 64). 
175  THE REPUBLIC, supra n. _____, at 565c-d (p. 256). 
176  THE PRINCE, supra n. ____ at Chapter 26 (p. 97).   
This opportunity, therefore, must not be allowed to pass, so that Italy, after so long a time, 
may find her redeemer.  I cannot describe how much love, with what thirst for revenge, with 
what resolute loyalty, and what tenderness, with what tears he would be received in all those 
provinces which have endured these foreign hordes.  What gates would be closed to him?  
What people would deny him obedience?  Whose envy would oppose him?  What Italian 
would withhold his allegiance?  This barbarian domination stinks in everyone’s nostrils.  Let 
your illustrious house take up this task, then, with that boldness and with that hope which is 
reserved to just enterprises, so that this nation may be ennobled under you banner and so that 
under your auspices the words Petrarch wrote may come true: Against barbarian rage, Virtue 
will take the field; then short the fight; True to their lineage, Italian hearts will prove their 
Roman might. 
177  THE REPUBLIC, supra n. ___ at 569b-c (p. 261). 
178  Id. at 565d-568d (p 257-261). Plato even observed that the tyrant would no doubt attract poets and 
other people capable of persuading others of the advantages of the tyrant’s system.  Id. at 568a-c (p.260).  
Machiavelli’s championing of Cesare Borgia looks perhaps even worse is such light.  See THE PRINCE, 
supra n. _____, at _____. 
 Another aspect of the Tyrant, and a very important one for Plato, is that the Tyrant’s appetites do not 
bring him satisfaction.  Instead, they increase anxiety, for the Tyrant believes all share his approach and is 
always fearful of the next Tyrant.  So just like the Prince, the Tyrant pays intense attention to those who he 
rules.  But not to appease them, but to locate threats.  This is why Plato believes that the unjust man, of 
with the Tyrant is the paramount example, cannot be happy.  Id. 
179  Id. 
 It is a fair question as to whether the Tyrant would be happier and less insecure were he to have The 
Prince to examine.  At first, a distinction can be made that between the Tyrant and the Prince are those 
appetites.  For Machiavelli, a Prince is focused on stability, and he cannot be seen as giving his desires free 
reign less it threaten his rule.  THE PRINCE, supra n. ___, at Ch. 18 (p. 68-69).  He would agree that the 
Tyrant’s rule cannot last because his appetites will cause him to be hated.  
 Machiavelli’s argument, for Plato, falls apart because of Machiavelli’s insistence that the only art that 
the Prince should be concerned with are the military ones.  Id. at _____.   Such a training, however, simply 
replicates the Homeric insistence on winning and personal excellence being one and the same.  E.g., THE 
REPUBLIC, supra n. ____, at 390-391c (pp. 87-88) (Where Socrates asserts that the actions ascribed to 
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 So how is the city to avoid the injustice personified by the tyrant?  In a word: 
education.  For Plato, education was the crucial component for justice: educate citizens 
properly, and the ruler (who comes from the citizens, and is sometimes directly chosen by 
them) will be just as a matter of habit.180  This is especially important because Plato felt 
that a guardian must be “high spirited,” a person who actually wants to lead and have 
others follow him.181  Plato was aware such high spirits can cause people to be “quick-
tempered and savage with one another.”182  Therefore, there must be some means by 
which rulers can learn to be “fierce to their enemies but gentle to their friends” lest they 
“destroy one another before their enemies ever get at them.”183  In order to know when to 
be fierce and when to be gentle, a ruler must be a lover of learning, a philosopher.184  
This makes education a vital component for a just society, because it is only through 
education that justice can be nurtured within each individual.185  
                                                                                                                                            
Achilles in the Illiad cannot have been those a virtuous person, despite Homer’s insistence otherwise).  The 
Tyrant’s appetites arise, in part, because of that training.  Instead, and this is the crucial point for Plato, it is 
the education that a ruler receives beyond the purely military ones, that create an excellent ruler.  It is not 
enough that rulers know how to fight.  The ruler must also be philosopher, which is to say, a person who is 
concerned with, and the training to be able, to find out the truth. 
180  Id. at 473c-e (p. 165) 
Unless philosophers become kings in our cities, or unless those who are know kings and 
rulers become true philosophers, so that political power and philosophic intelligence 
converge, and unless those lesser natures who run after one without the other are excluded 
from governing, I believe there can be no end to troubles, my dear Glacon, in our cities or for 
all mankind.  Only then will our theory of the state spring to life and see the light of day, at 
least to the degree possible. 
181  Id. at 375b (p. 71). 
182  Id. 
183  Id. at 375c (p. 71). 
184  Id. at 376b-c (p.72) 
Do you not see that knowing and not knowing are the sole criteria the dog uses to distinguish 
friend from enemy?  Does it not follow that any animal that verifies his likes and dislikes by 
the test of knowledge and ignorance must be a lover of learning? 
 Oh, indeed. 
 And is not the love of learning the same as the love of wisdom which, in turn, is 
philosophy? 
 All are identical. 
 Then let us be bold.  Having made the case for the dog, let us make the case for the man 
as well: he who is gentle to his friends and to those he knows must by nature be a philosopher. 
185  Id. at 376c-d (p. 72) 
But now comes the question of his upbringing and education.  How shall we manage them?  
Is this question not germane to the principle objective of our inquiry, namely, the origin and 
role of justice and injustice in the city?  Of course, we do not want to be tedious by 
prolonging the argument beyond a reasonable length.  Neither, however, do we want to omit 
anything essential to our discussion. 
 The question of education is clearly relevant to our inquiry. 
 The question of the educations curriculum was equally important for Plato: 
Then you will understand that the most important part of any work is its beginning.  This is 
especially true for the education of young children.  At this tender age they are the most 
impressionable and therefore most likely to adopt any and all models set before them. 
 True. 
 28 
 It is within his discussion of the ideal educational curriculum, and the exclusion of the 
heroic poems from it, that Plato presents the characteristics of the just ruler and the just 
society: a ruler must be able to identify a wrong and not excuse it because it was the 
action of a god or other powerful figure;186 restraint cannot be abandoned in order to 
punish wrongdoing;187 oaths and treaties (which had the force of law in Ancient Greece), 
once taken, should be followed;188  be courageous;189 be truthful unless there is a 
legitimate public good, such as deceiving enemies, for a lie;190 be moderate in all 
conduct, especially those concerning bodily appetites;191 and do not let the desire for 
wealth get in the way of doing what is proper and humane.192  It is important to note here 
that, according to Plato, it is the combination of all these characteristics that lead to 
justice; justice does not exist on its own. 
 The fact that Plato targeted the heroic myths is especially crucial to the discussion of 
CSR and business ethics in general.  Plato quite deliberately wanted to have stories of bad 
conduct by powerful people excluded because of the tendency to glorify such behaviors 
simply because they are done by the powerful.  It was his belief that rather than serving 
as cautionary tales, such stories instead became examples to be emulated.193  At a time 
when powerful business people are referred to as “Masters of the Universe,” Plato’s 
argument here resonates.  
 
IV. Corporate Virtue: The Fate Of CSR at the Hands of Philosophy. 
 
 Having examined The Prince and The Republic, it now comes time to apply them to 
CSR and the modern corporation.  When examined in terms of the self-preservation of 
the corporate entity, Machiavellian concepts support the shareholder primacy norm while 
Plato’s ideas could be argued as landing on the side of the Progressives.  What seems 
equally clear, however, is that examples support each models’ approach to CSR as 
making good business sense—it all depends on what particular situation a company finds 
itself in.  However, when the analysis shifts to how those who manage the corporation 
                                                                                                                                            
 Then we can hardly afford to let the children listen to just any tales or fables recounted by 
just any teachers who happen along.  We surely don’t want the children to adopt opinions and 
beliefs that might be largely contrary to the kinds of values we deem desirable for them to 
have when they become adults. 
Id. at 377a-b (p. 73). 
186  Id. at 378b (p. 74). 
187  Id. 
188  Id. at 379e (p. 76). 
189  Id. at 386a (p. 82). 
190  Id. at 389b-c (p. 85). 
191  Id. at 389d-e (p. 86). 
192  Id. at 390e (p. 87). 
193  See id. at 378b-c (p. 74), 388d (p. 85), 391e (p. 88). 
 Plato’s discussion of Achilles’ conduct in the Illiad provides a good example of his concern. 
 That Achilles actually did all these things is something we must not believe.  We shall 
reject the charges that he dragged Hector’s body around the tomb of Paroclus and slew living 
victims on the funeral pyre.  We must not suffer our youth to suppose that Achilles, pupil of 
most wise Chiron–Achilles, son of a goddess and of Peleus, the most chaste of men and 
grandson of Zeus–could be so at odds with himself as to suffer from two contradictory 
maladies: greed such as becomes no free man and a brazen arrogance towards both gods and 
men.  
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utilize CSR, it appears that management can (and do) adopt either of these two 
positions—a shareholder primacy norm or a Progressive stance—to support the decisions 
made.  Thus, corporate managers may be operating under a Machiavellian model that is 
not embodied by either of these two legal approaches to CSR, but which mimics them as 
a justification to achieve a self-interested result. 
 
A. The Prince, Shareholder Primacy, and CSR. 
 
 There is a direct correlation between The Prince and CSR.  As the prince has absolute 
power, any action he takes is discretionary—he has no obligation to follow the law 
because he is the law.  Some proponents of the shareholder primacy norm, such as 
Easterbrook and Fischel, take a similar position, arguing that any obligation to comply 
with a law is simply a question of balancing the costs and benefits of following that law 
against the gains to be made by breaking it.194  For a princely CEO following 
Machiavelli, the first issue must be whether CSR should, in fact, be followed as corporate 
policy.  And the Machiavellian position is clear, it is the survival of the corporation that is 
paramount.  Thus, while Machiavelli clearly instructs that virtue should not stop the 
corporation from pursuing its own interests, neither should the absence of virtue condemn 
it.   
 Looking to the progressive side of CSR, Machiavelli’s prince would not approve.  
More than likely, the prince would find such expenditures as wasteful, devoted more to 
the appearance of propriety rather than actually benefitting the company.  If so, then such 
activities must cease if the current management is to continue.  And there are examples 
that bear this out: 
Cummins Engine, one of the pioneers of the corporate social responsibility 
movement, had to abandon its paternalistic employment policies and its 
generous contributions to its communities when its investors demanded 
higher returns.  Dayton Hudson, another notably socially responsible 
company, came close to being swallowed up in a hostile takeover during 
the 1980s, and has since then paid exclusive attention to its customers and 
investors.  Levi Strauss, also once on everyone's list of America's most 
socially responsible companies in part because of its commitment to 
source its clothing from domestic manufacturers, faced plummeting sales 
in the 1990s and had to eliminate its remaining domestic production.  
Polaroid, another pioneer, filed for bankruptcy in 2001.  The shares of 
Britain's retailer Marks & Spencer, which had ranked near the top in a 
survey of worldwide labor standards, performed so poorly the firm 
attracted a hostile takeover bid in 2004.  Both Body Shop International 
and Ben & Jerry's had been touted as among the nation's most socially 
responsible companies until investor pressure pushed Body Shop founder 
Anita Roddick into an advisory role and Ben & Jerry's was taken over by 
Unilever.195 
Furthermore, corporate officers seem to follow Machiavelli’s, and Friedman’s, advice 
with regard to spending corporate assets.  According to Robert Reich: 
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The only legitimate reason for a corporation to be generous with its 
shareholders' money is to burnish its brand image, and such a rationale 
will go only so far. In Katrina's aftermath, Wal-Mart's [CEO] Scott was 
candid about the limits of his firm's generosity. "We can't send three trailer 
loads of merchandise to every group that asks for it," he said, turning 
down a request for two thousand blankets. "We have to, at the end of this, 
have a viable business."  Charitable giving by corporations is infinitely 
small compared to what the public sector dispenses.196 
So, when faced with the possibility of failure, corporate officers seemingly appear ready 
to follow Machiavelli’s advice to do whatever is necessary to ensure their personal 
survival, which would, arguably, also insure the survival of their companies. In other 
words, following the shareholder primacy norm would make Machiavellian sense as well 
as good business sense. 
 
B. The Republic, Progressives, and CSR 
 
 Despite the litany of bad results from its practice, noted above, CSR retains vitality 
within the mindset of those concerned with corporate policy.  As Cynthia Williams has 
noted, “major global companies are increasingly involved in various CSR initiatives that 
suggest a burgeoning sense of social obligation that goes beyond ‘mere’ law.…Thus, 
over the past five years, initiatives have proliferated that aim to increase social and 
environmental transparency, accountability and adherence to particularized standards of 
substantive social and environmental conduct.”197  What accounts for this continued 
willingness on the part of corporate officers to engage in activities that take money away 
from the corporation and its shareholders?  A simple explanation would be that it’s the 
right thing to do.  For example, the Dutch logistics company TNT, sent company 
resources and people into two dozen natural disasters between 2002 and 2007, including 
the Asian Tsunami of 2004.198  When asked why it does this, Luis Oelrich, the Director 
of TNT’s Moving the World program responded, “People feel this is a company that does 
more than take care of the bottom line …It's providing a soul to TNT.”199 Google, the 
search engine giant, incorporated  the slogan “Don’t Be Evil” as part of its corporate 
identity and backs it up with an open-ended set of employee policies.200   
  It is the Platonic ideal that is at work here.  Plato advocated for rulers of high virtue 
not because such virtues were good in themselves, but because such rulers would see to it 
that Athens would survive and thrive.201  More and more corporations are doing good, but 
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part of the motivation is a desire to do well as companies.  TNT, mentioned above, 
partners with one of its most important customers, the United Nation’s World Food 
Program (“WFP”), in intervening in disasters.202  This connection allows it to be more 
efficient in dealing with the WFP in its commercial activities, and it also acts as an 
incentive to recruit top talent.203  Coca-Cola, the world’s largest beverage company, has 
targeted preserving the world’s freshwater supply, something vital to its survival as a 
company, as well as to the survival of its customers.204  Seventh Generation is a $150 
million maker of environmental household products whose entire corporate purpose is to 
help its customers buy sustainable goods—yet when the company went public, brokers 
promoted it because it was a good investment, pure and simple.205 
 Such lofty sentiments as environmental protection also provide opportunities for 
businesses to save money by cutting waste and being more efficient.  Many of these 
business practices are simple to implement such as encouraging supermarket customers 
to bring reusable bags (instead of being supplied with free plastic ones) and turning off 
computers when leaving for the day to reduce overhead costs.206  Furthermore, the desire 
to reduce a company’s carbon footprint, without reducing profits, has yielded new 
approaches which reduce carbon emissions while increasing efficiency.207  Even more 
important, the desire to be environmentally conscious can lead companies to find new 
products to sell.208 
 It would seem, then, that an impasse has been reached.  Machiavelli’s and Plato’s 
ideals, applied at the company level, appear to lead to business success equally.  This 
would seem to suggest that whether a company follows all or part of a CSR agenda 
depends in part on the actual business conditions in which a company finds itself.  But, 
again, companies do not exist as freestanding entities.  They are dependent on people. 
 
C. Machiavellian Corporate Officers and Platonic Corporate Guardians. 
 
 So far, we have presented corporate managers as the princes of the corporation.  But a 
key component of Machiavelli, especially for those who seek business advice from him, 
is that he describes the world as he sees it, not as he wishes it to be.209  With this in mind, 
are corporate managers Machiavelli’s princes, or are they one of the foreign invaders that 
Machiavelli so desperately wanted thrown out — invaders who use the country’s 
resources for the benefit of his own foreign country (or himself)?  Consider that the 
Renaissance prince really did have his life on the line should he lose his throne.  At best, 
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a fallen prince faced poverty and exile, much as Machiavelli did.  But someone such as a 
CEO isn’t in this position.  Today’s “golden parachutes” generally guarantee a huge 
financial windfall for a fired CEO.  Furthermore, executive compensation in the forms of 
salary, bonus, and stock options all come from funds that otherwise would go to company 
operations, or the shareholders.  Thus, while the prince’s fortunes are directly related to 
and dependent upon the wealth of his state, the CEO’s or director’s priorities are not 
always so directly aligned and can at times actually be considered to conflict with the 
corporation’s priorities. 
 Therefore, if the corporate managers are actually a akin to a foreign power in the 
Machiavellian sense, then the prescriptions of frugality Machiavelli laid out for the 
domestic prince don’t apply to him.  In fact, such managers have every incentive to use 
the corporation’s assets for personal purposes, seeking to preserve and promote herself or 
himself regardless of the state of the corporation.  This view of the CEO or director under 
the Machiavellian model may more accurately describe what is really going on at the 
management level.  But this realization is not altogether surprising.  Others have already 
recognized that the shareholder primacy norm, with regard to corporate governance in 
general, is not a true reflection of what happens in day-to-day corporate governance.210  
Indeed, Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means argued (in their famous Berle-Means 
thesis) that the sharp divide between corporate ownership and control has resulted in 
management becoming the effective owners of a corporation.211  The implicit economic 
problem, as set forth in their thesis, is that corporate managers have the potential to act in 
their own self-interest or for some purpose other than profit maximization,212 a notion 
that would seem to run counter to a shareholder primacy norm.  Yet despite this 
separation of ownership and control, the shareholder primacy norm continues to remain 
the dominant theory of corporate governance.213  Indeed, corporate law scholars who 
have acknowledged the flaws in the shareholder primacy norm still maintain this norm as 
the ultimate goal of other models.  For instance, Professor Stephen Bainbridge has 
proposed a director primacy norm, which, while recognizing that the shareholder owners 
do not actually control the directors, nonetheless maintains that shareholder wealth 
maximization is the proper “end” of corporate governance.214 
 But if it is true that corporate officers and directors are in control, which clearly 
seems to be the case, then is it so surprising that these same managers do not always act 
in the best interest of the corporation?  Be it through ignorance of the duties owed to the 
corporation or due to more sinister motives, the past decade has provided numerous 
instances in which self-interest has seemingly been the guiding principle of corporate 
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managers.215  While the Enron debacle of the 2000s was once the most outrageous 
example of executive abuses, it is not isolated.216  We have since experienced a financial 
meltdown that has directly affected millions globally, but the officers and directors of 
many of the responsible institutions have suffered little consequence, and in some 
instances, continue to reap large bonuses.217 
 Accepting that corporate managers are foreign powers rather than princes, under the 
Machiavellian model, these managers will place their own interests ahead of those of the 
corporation.  But what does this mean for CSR and its applications?  In many instances, 
little difference may be noticed between the Machiavellian model and the shareholder 
primacy norm.  This is due largely to the often convergent interests of the corporation and 
the officer or director.  Generally speaking, actions which benefit the corporation, 
likewise benefit management.  Shareholder wealth maximization offers job stability, and 
because the officers and directors are often shareholders themselves, it is in their own 
self-interest to pursue shareholder wealth maximization.  For instance, in light of the 
Citizens United decision, corporations may very well have even greater influence over 
the political process and greater ability to use this influence to elect candidates who may 
favor limiting the liability of corporations and its officers.  While it is possible that 
corporate managers will use this influence to promote their own self-interests, in many 
cases those interests will dovetail with those of the corporation, and thus the 
Machiavellian model will more-or-less disguise itself under the shareholder primacy 
norm model.  However, there remain areas where the interests of the corporation and the 
interests of its managers diverge.  In these instances, the Machiavellian model sometimes 
takes on the guise of a Progressive point of view. 
 For instance, one area in which shareholder interests and management interests may 
diverge is within the context of a hostile takeover.  In a takeover, the offering price per 
share may very well exceed the trading price, sometimes quite significantly.218  Such a 
takeover bid would appear to be in the best interests of the shareholders; however, the 
officers and directors may well be resistant to such a takeover, as it has the very real 
potential to negatively impact their own employment or continued membership on the 
board.219  Thus, corporate management may take actions such as adopting a “poison pill” 
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strategy, making it much more difficult, and expensive, to complete the takeover.220  
Though such actions would seem to be directly in conflict with the shareholders’ 
interests, the corporate law of many states are rather accommodating to such decisions, 
either respecting them under the business judgment rule221 or adopting so-called “other 
constituency”  statutes which allow for corporate managers to take into account the 
interests of other stakeholders beyond just the shareholders.222 
 At first blush, such statutes appear to be a nod to the progressive stakeholder model of 
corporate governance.  However, in reality these statutes have the potential to be used to 
basically justify self-interested decisions by directors.223  Though two-thirds of the states 
have adopted some form of “other constituency” statute, concern over abuse has 
prompted some commentators and states to reject such proposed statutes.  As, the 
Corporations Committee of the State Bar of California noted in its condemnation of a 
proposal to adopt such a statute: 
Instead of promoting corporate social responsibility, the Committee 
believes that the [proposed other constituency statute] would lead to less 
director accountability, less responsive corporate governance and, 
ultimately, less socially responsible corporate behavior, for the following 
reasons: 
• The Bill would undermine director accountability to shareholders 
without effectively promoting interests of non-shareholder constituents. 
• The Bill is unnecessary because current law is not an impediment to 
responsible corporate behavior and there are less intrusive means of 
protecting the interest of non-shareholder constituents. 
                                                
220 See A HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS LAW TERMS 459 (Bryan A. Garner, ed. 1999) (defining a “poison pill” 
as “A corporation’s defense against an unwanted takeover bid whereby shareholders are granted the right to 
acquire equity or debt securities at a favorable price in order to increase the bidder’s acquisition costs.”). 
221 See, e.g. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).  In upholding the 
board’s decision to reject a tender offer which it deemed too low, the Delaware Supreme Court stated, 
A further aspect [of the business judgment rule] is the element of balance. If a defensive 
measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable 
in relation to the threat posed. This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the 
takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of such concerns may 
include: inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of 
illegality, the impact on “constituencies” other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, 
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of 
nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being offered in the exchange. 
Id. at 955. 
222 See Jack B. Jacobs, The Reach of State Corporate Law Beyond State Borders: Reflections Upon 
Federalism, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1167-68 (2009) (“By way of example, beginning in the 1980s, thirty-
one states, including Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Rhode Island, adopted so-called “other constituency” 
statutes.  These statutes did two things. First, they relieved target company boards from any obligation, in 
responding to a takeover bid, to treat the interests of shareholders as paramount over all others. Second, 
they permitted those boards to consider the effects of a hostile takeover on other constituency groups, such 
as employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and local communities.”). 
223 Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Statutes Under 
the takings Clause, 24 J. CORP.L. 1, 2 (1998) (“These statutes turn the well-ordered world of corporate 
ownership and management responsibility on its head. By permitting . . . managers to consider the interests 
of non-shareholder “stakeholders” in the corporation . . . these constituency statutes blur the lines of 
corporate control and ownership and create a class of managers whose decisions are utterly discretionary 
and unfettered by the normal (albeit weak) controls imposed by traditional corporate law doctrine.”). 
 35 
• The Bill has the potential for causing significant economic harm to 
shareholders and the public generally.224 
Thus, in states where constituency statutes have passed, it can be argued that this is one 
area in which the self-interest of management has not only prevailed, but has done so 
with the aid of state legislatures under a Progressive guise. 
 Another area where the Machivellian model has the potential to diverge from the 
shareholder primacy norm is in the area of legal compliance.  To illustrate, we return to 
the ABC Corporation hypothetical from Part II., supra.  Under a shareholder primacy 
norm, the corporate managers should be motivated by what is in the best interests of the 
corporation.  Easterbrook and Fischel would argue that this requires a balancing of the 
fines imposed by legal noncompliance and the risk of getting caught.  However, under the 
Machiavellian model, the corporate manager will worry more about the personal impact 
of compliance or non-compliance rather than its impact on the corporation.  If there is 
little chance of personal civil or criminal liability, and legal noncompliance could lead to 
higher profits, then the officer will be less diligent about ensuring legal compliance or 
may be more willing to engage in activities that operate in a legal “gray” area. 
From a Progressive stand-point, such behavior is offensive as it ignores the 
stakeholders who are adversely affected.  And though such conduct may potentially reap 
benefits for the shareholders, shareholder primacy norm proponents should be equally 
offended as a proper balancing of risks versus benefits has not taken place – the process 
has been skewed by the self-interest of the corporate managers.  While it is true that 
shareholders have the ability to sue for breaches of fiduciary duties, given the difficulties 
of bringing a derivative suit and the deference afforded management under the business 
judgment rule, the protections offered by the prospect of such a suit will likely only be 
effective in the most egregious of cases.225  This is not to say, however, that such self-
interest is the norm—we lack empirical data to stoutly support such a claim.  But given 
the events of the past decade, it seems beyond plausible that a Machiavellian model is at 




While The Prince was Machiavelli’s attempt to secure the good graces of the Medici 
family, it was not necessarily a description of what thought was the ideal method of 
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leaning to his feelings on governance.227  In this regard, The Prince may not have been a 
work of advocacy, but a descriptive work in which Machiavelli was merely recognizing 
what he saw around him. 
Conversely, current legal academic debate over CSR and its proper role in the 
company has reflected less of what is actually happening and more of an ideal.  
Shareholder primacy proponents have advocated that the proper “end” is to maximize 
shareholder wealth.  While those within this camp might quibble to varying degrees over 
the means to this end, the focus is undoubtedly on the “owners” of the corporation, ie. the 
shareholders.  In response to this school of thought, Progressives have advocated a 
broader stakeholder model that takes into account the interests of all those affected by the 
corporation. 
Each of these schools of thought have attractive features, however, we feel that both 
fail to reflect, at least to some degree, the true state of things.  Thus, just as The Prince 
described a model of governance perceived by Machiavelli, we believe that a 
Machiavellian model more aptly describes the governance model of corporate 
management, at least in some corporations and amongst some officers and directors.  
This realization is not a purely academic exercise, though such a label is tempting, 
particularly when relying upon such classic works.  Instead, the realization and 
acceptance that corporate management is operating under such a model is an important 
first step in crafting laws and policies geared to achieve what we believe is the proper 
role of corporate management, be it to maximize shareholder wealth or to more broadly 
use corporate wealth to do good, while also doing well.  Furthermore, it is an important 
first step in achieving a broader goal which Google has claimed as its own corporate 





                                                                                                                                            
beliefs: he interprets the great Roman historian’s History of Rome as offering viable models to be emulated 
in his own time.  The Prince, on the other hand, is seen as offering viable classical models to a single 
ruler.”). 
227 Id. 
228 Google Code of Conduct, Preface available at http://investor.google.com/corporate/code-of-
conduct.html.  
